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1.	  Introduction	  On	  February	  2005,	  three	  PayPal	  employees,	  Jawed	  Karim,	  Chad	  Hurley	  and	  Steve	  Chen,	  attended	  a	  San	  Francisco	  dinner	  party,	  at	  which	  they	  started	  talking	  about	  various	   topics	   that	   included	   the	   Asian	   tsunami	   and	   Janet	   Jackson’s	   wardrobe	  malfunction	   at	   the	   previous	   year’s	   Super	   Bowl.	   The	   result	   of	   such	   a	   random	  conversation	  was	  the	  idea	  to	  create	  a	  website	  in	  which	  users	  could	  upload	  videos	  they	   wanted	   to	   share	   to	   the	   world.	   On	   May	   2005,	   the	   three	   went	   ahead	   and	  founded	  a	  small	  video-­‐sharing	  website	  that	  later	  became	  known	  as	  YouTube.1	  	  Just	  over	  a	  year	  after,	  YouTube	  had	  grown	  to	  be	  one	  of	  the	  most	  important	  sites	  in	  the	  Internet;	  by	  July	  2006	  the	  site	  was	  receiving	  100	  million	  uploads	  per	  day	  and	  its	  content	  accounted	  for	  60%	  of	  all	  videos	  watched	  online	  at	  the	  time.2	  The	  site’s	  popularity	  was	   such	   that	  Google	  acquired	   it	   in	  November	  2006	   for	  $1.65	  billion	  USD	  in	  stock.3	  While	   the	   original	   intent	   of	   YouTube	   was	   to	   provide	   a	   platform	   in	   which	   the	  public	  would	  upload	  their	  own	  family	  events,	  recorded	  thoughts,	  video	  logs,	  and	  other	  user-­‐generated	  content,	   the	  site	  was	  from	  the	  start	  accused	  of	   facilitating	  large-­‐scale	  copyright	  infringement.4	  However,	  despite	  having	  clips	  of	  TV	  shows,	  movies,	   music	   videos,	   and	   a	   myriad	   of	   other	   protected	   content,	   YouTube	  managed	  to	  avoid	  being	  sued	  for	  a	  relatively	   long	  period	  of	   its	  early	   life,	  which	  allowed	  the	  site	  to	  cement	  its	  prominent	  position	  amongst	  what	  was	  a	  growing	  and	   important	   sector	   of	   the	   online	   environment.	   The	   reason	   why	   YouTube	  managed	  to	  stay	  on	  the	  right	  side	  of	   the	   law	  came	  down	  to	   the	   fact	   that	   it	  was	  actually	   protected	   by	   copyright	   legislation.	   YouTube	   always	   claimed	   that	   it	  would	   cooperate	   with	   content	   owners	   and	   that	   it	   would	   remove	   infringing	  material.	  This	  allowed	  it	  to	  operate	  within	  the	  parameters	  of	  existing	  legislation	  as	  an	  online	  service	  provider,	  protected	  by	  the	  safeguards	  built	   into	  the	  Digital	  Millennium	   Copyright	   Act	   (DMCA)	   in	   order	   to	   shelter	   intermediaries	   from	  litigation.	  	  However,	  this	  all	  changed	  in	  March	  2007	  when	  media	  conglomerate	  Viacom	  filed	  a	  $1	  billion	  USD	  lawsuit5	  against	  Google	  and	  YouTube	  alleging	  direct	  and	  indirect	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  *	  Senior	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  Intellectual	  Property	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  University	  of	  Sussex.	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  Hopkins	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  Arrington	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  TechCrunch	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copyright	  infringement.	  This	  move	  by	  Viacom	  was	  surprising	  given	  the	  fact	  that	  	  the	  law	  was	  strongly	  on	  the	  side	  of	  Google.	  Unsurprisingly,	  Viacom	  lost	  the	  case	  after	  a	  motion	   for	  summary	   judgement	  was	  accepted,	   ruling	   that	  YouTube	  was	  indeed	   protected	   by	   the	  DMCA’s	   safe	   harbor	   provisions.	   In	   other	  words,	   as	   an	  intermediary	  online	  service,	  YouTube	  was	  not	  liable	  if	  it	  could	  show	  that	  it	  had	  a	  notice	  and	  takedown	  provision	  for	  potentially	  infringing	  content.	  	  The	   only	   surprising	   element	   of	   the	   whole	   YouTube	   saga	   is	   that	   there	   was	   a	  content	  owner	  willing	  to	  sue	  them	  in	  the	  first	  place.	  From	  relatively	  early	  in	  the	  history	  of	  Internet	  regulation,	  it	  has	  been	  understood	  that	  intermediaries	  should	  be	   given	   some	   sort	   of	   limitation	   of	   liability	   for	   infringing	   or	   illegal	   content	  uploaded	  to	  a	  website	  by	  its	  users,	  as	  it	  became	  evident	  that	  many	  sites	  did	  not	  have	  the	  capacity	  to	  police	  content	  a	  priori.	  This	  limitation	  of	  liability	  was	  set	  in	  stone	   in	   legislation	   through	   international	   treaties,	   European	   Directives	   and	  national	  legislation.	  	  Despite	  all	  of	  the	  above,	  in	  recent	  years	  we	  have	  witnessed	  attempt	  after	  attempt	  by	  content	  owners	  to	  try	  to	  hold	   intermediaries	   liable	   in	  some	  way	  or	  another,	  first	  by	  infringement	  suits	  such	  as	  Viacom’s,	  to	  more	  indirect	  approaches,	  such	  as	  trying	  to	  force	  intermediaries	  to	  filter	  or	  block	  information.	  	  	  This	  article	  looks	  at	  the	  more	  recent	  efforts	  to	  erode	  the	  principles	  of	  limitation	  of	   liability	   that	  have	   served	  as	   the	   cornerstone	  of	   Internet	   regulation	   for	   some	  years.	  We	  will	  briefly	  study	  existing	  legislation	  and	  then	  we	  will	  chart	  the	  latest	  efforts	   to	   see	   the	   attacks	   on	   these	   limits,	   particularly	   by	   the	   introduction	   of	  graduated	  response,	  and	  the	  case	  law	  that	  seeks	  other	  solutions,	  such	  as	  filtering	  and	  blocking.	  	  This	   area	   is	   reasonably	  harmonised	  at	   an	   international	   level,	   so	  we	  will	   take	  a	  broad	   comparative	   approach.	   Intermediary	   liability	   also	   covers	   such	   different	  topics	   as	   defamation	   and	   pornography.	   The	   article	  will	   try	   to	   centre	   its	   sights	  specifically	  on	  copyright	  law,	  although	  some	  other	  examples	  will	  be	  used	  where	  relevant.	  	  	  
2.	  Don’t	  shoot	  the	  messenger	  It	   would	   be	   remiss	   not	   to	   provide	   a	   description	   of	   the	   current	   state	   of	   the	  legislation,	  as	   it	  serves	  to	  explain	  the	  most	  recent	  developments.	  The	  prevalent	  limitation	  of	   liability	  for	  intermediaries	  arises	  from	  the	  earliest	  case	  law,	  which	  surprisingly	  predates	  the	  Internet	  as	  we	  know	  it.	  Before	  the	  popularisation	  of	  the	  World	  Wide	  Web,	  most	  online	  services	  consisted	  of	  what	   is	  known	  as	  Bulleting	  Board	  System	  (BBS),6	  dial-­‐in	  servers	  where	  users	  could	  chat,	  download	  content	  and	  experience	  many	   features	   that	  would	   later	  become	   the	  Web.	  These	  boards	  were	  rife	  with	  infringing	  copyright	  material,	  which	  made	  them	  viable	  targets	  for	  litigation,	  mostly	  in	  the	  US.	  In	  some	  of	  the	  earliest	  cases,	  the	  operators	  of	  these	  BBS	   services	  were	   held	   liable	   for	   copyright	   infringement,	  mostly	   because	   they	  uploaded	   the	   content.	   In	   a	   good	  number	  of	   cases	   the	  BBS	  operators	  were	  held	  liable	   for	   facilitating	   the	   posting	   of	   software	   owned	   by	   the	   plaintiffs;	   this	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  6	  See:	  http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bulletin_board_system.	  	  	  
happened	   in	   litigation	   such	   as	   Playboy	   Enterprises	   v	   Frena,7	  Sega	   Enterprises	   v	  
Sabella8	  and	  Sega Enterprises v MAPHIA.9	  With	   the	   move	   from	   BBS	   to	   the	   Internet,	   case	   law	   began	   to	   shift,	   as	   Internet	  Service	   Providers	   (ISPs)	   did	   not	   have	   the	   same	   level	   of	   control	   over	   content	  posted	  on	  their	  servers.	  While	  it	  was	  easy	  to	  hold	  liable	  a	  few	  hobbyist	  operators	  of	  small	  and	  medium	  scale	  services	  for	  content	  in	  their	  networks,	  the	  same	  was	  considerably	   more	   difficult	   when	   the	   intermediaries	   did	   not	   have	   editorial	  control	  over	  their	  systems.	  	  We	  then	  start	  to	  witness	  cases	  that	  show	  what	  is	  to	  become	   the	  norm,	  as	  content	  owners	  were	  willing	   to	   terminate	   litigation	   if	   the	  intermediary	  would	  remove	  infringing	  content.	  This	  was	  the	  case	  with	  software	  manufacturer	   Adobe	   Systems,	   who	   dropped	   two	   cases	   against	   different	   ISPs	  when	  they	  agreed	  to	  remove	  infringing	  material	  and	  make	  efforts	  to	  stop	  it	  from	  happening	  again.10	  	  The	  turning	  point	  in	  case	  law	  was	  one	  of	  the	  various	  Scientology-­‐related	  pieces	  of	   litigation	   at	   the	   time.	   The	   Church	   of	   Scientology	   became	   famous	   for	   using	  copyright	   law	   to	   try	   to	   stop	   critics	   from	   posting	   what	   it	   considered	   to	   be	  protected	   material	   online	   that	   revealed	   secrets	   from	   the	   organisation.	   In	  
Religious Technology Center v Netcom,11 customers of Netcom, an ISP that also 
operated as a BBS, uploaded content that belonged to the plaintiffs to a board hosted 
by the defendant. The Church of Scientology sued the ISP alleging direct, vicarious 
and contributory copyright infringement, opening the question of whether an 
intermediary could be held directly liable for content that had been uploaded by one 
of its users. The Federal District Court for the Northern District of California ruled 
that Netcom could not be held directly liable for any infringing material posted by its 
clients, since Netcom itself did not upload the material. The court also decided that 
there was not enough of a link between the infringing activity and Netcom's finances 
to hold Netcom vicariously liable, but it did not rule on the contributory question. 
Although there were other cases after Netcom where ISPs were held liable,12 an 
important precedent had been set. It became understood that any interceding service 
that did not upload infringing content directly should not be held directly responsible 
for the illegal and/or infringing actions of its customers.    It	  was	  not	  long	  until	  this	  principle	  was	  set	  into	  law.	  Firstly,	  the	  Berne	  Copyright	  Convention	   allows	   member	   states	   to	   set	   exceptions	   and	   limitations	   to	   the	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  11	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  12	  For	   example,	   Geffen	   Records,	   Inc.,	   et	   al.	   v	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   Bizness,	   et	   al.,	   No.	   98-­‐CV-­‐00794,	   (D.	   Ariz.	  5/5/98),	  where	  representatives	  of	  the	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  industry	  won	  a	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  restraining	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  an	  ISP	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  allowed	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exclusive	  right	  of	  reproduction	  that	  comply	  with	  the	  three-­‐step	  test13	  contained	  in	   Art.	   9(2),	   which	   states	   that	   limitations	   must	   be	   “in	   certain	   special	   cases,	  provided	  that	  such	  reproduction	  does	  not	  conflict	  with	  a	  normal	  exploitation	  of	  the	   work	   and	   does	   not	   unreasonably	   prejudice	   the	   legitimate	   interests	   of	   the	  author.”	  The	  World	  Intellectual	  Property	  (WIPO)	  expanded	  the	  application	  of	  the	  three-­‐step	  test	  to	  all	  other	  rights	  protected	  by	  the	  1996	  WIPO	  Copyright	  Treaty	  (WCT).	  	  The	   existence	   (and	   expansion)	   of	   the	   three-­‐step	   test	   allowed	   the	   enactment	   of	  the	  introduction	  of	  a	  very	  strong	  limitation	  of	  liability	  contained	  in	  the	  DMCA	  in	  the	  United	  States.	  §512	  of	   the	  DMCA14	  dictates	   that	   intermediaries	   shall	  not	  be	  held	  liable	  for	  monetary	  or	  injunctive	  relief	  for	  content	  uploaded	  to	  a	  network	  by	  its	  users	  if	  they	  do	  not	  have	  actual	  knowledge	  that	  the	  material	  uploaded	  to	  their	  systems	  is	  infringing;	  and	  that	  when	  it	  is	  notified	  of	  the	  presence	  of	  such	  items,	  “acts	  expeditiously	  to	  remove,	  or	  disable	  access	  to,	  the	  material”.	  	  This	  limitation	  was	  eventually	  replicated	  throughout	  Europe	  with	  the	  enactment	  of	   the	  E-­‐Commerce	  Directive.15	  In	   the	   prelude	   of	   the	   instrument,	   the	  EU	   states	  clearly	   that	   this	   is	   an	   area	   where	   harmonisation	   is	   necessary	   for	   the	   proper	  functioning	   of	   the	   common	   market,	   as	   it	   would	   create	   barriers	   to	   the	   cross-­‐border	   provision	   of	   services,	   and	   lead	   to	   competitive	   distortions.	   The	   EU	  recognised	   that	   there	   is	   a	   balance	   to	   be	   struck,	   and	   created	   a	   system	   of	  exemption	  of	   liability	   for	   intermediaries	  who	  act	  as	   “mere	  conduit”	  and	  do	  not	  exercise	   an	   editing	   or	   monitoring	   function.	   The	   Directive	   establishes	   that	   an	  intermediary	   that	   expeditiously	   removes	   access	   to	   illicit	   content	   once	   notified	  will	   therefore	  not	  be	  held	   liable	   for	   that	   content.	  Art	   12.1	   states	   that	   a	   service	  provider	  will	   not	  be	   liable	   for	   the	   information	   transmitted	  via	   its	  network	   if	   it	  does	   not	   initiate	   the	   transmission;	   does	   not	   select	   the	   receiver	   of	   the	  transmission,	  and	  does	  not	  modify	  its	  content.	  	  Moreover,	   the	   E-­‐Commerce	   Directive	   ruled	   out	   the	   creation	   of	   monitoring	  obligations	  for	  intermediaries.	  Art.	  15	  says	  that	  the	  limitation	  of	  liability	  should	  not	  be	  read	  as	  providing	  any	  obligation	  “to	  monitor	  the	  information	  which	  they	  transmit	  or	  store,	  nor	  a	  general	  obligation	  actively	  to	  seek	  facts	  or	  circumstances	  indicating	  illegal	  activity.”	  In	  other	  words,	  providers	  of	  online	  services	  will	  not	  be	  responsible	  for	  illegal	  content	  that	  has	  been	  made	  available	  in	  their	  networks	  by	  customers	  if	  they	  are	  mere	  conduits	  and	  also	  have	  procedures	  in	  place	  to	  remove	  the	  content	  quickly,	  and	  they	  will	  not	  be	  obliged	  to	  monitor	  activity	  in	  advance.	  	  	  	  The	  principle	  of	  limitation	  of	  liability	  for	  ISPs	  and	  other	  middle-­‐men	  has	  spread	  to	   many	   other	   jurisdictions.	   For	   example,	   the	   multilateral	   trade	   agreement	  between	   the	   United	   States	   and	   Central	   American	   countries,	   known	   as	   the	  Dominican	   Republic-­‐Central	   American	   Free	   Trade	   Agreement	   (DR-­‐CAFTA)	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  13	  Senftleben	  MRF,	  Copyright,	  Limitations,	  and	  the	  Three-­‐Step	  Test:	  An	  Analysis	  of	   the	  Three-­‐Step	  
Test	   in	   International	   and	   EC	   Copyright	   Law,	   The	   Hague;	   London:	   Kluwer	   Law	   International	  (2004).	  	  14	  §512(c)(1),	  Title	  17,	  Chapter	  5,	  U.S.	  Code.	  	  15	  Directive	  2000/31/EC	  of	  the	  European	  Parliament	  and	  of	  the	  Council	  of	  8	  June	  2000	  on	  certain	  legal	   aspects	  of	   information	   society	   services,	   in	  particular	   electronic	   commerce,	   in	   the	   Internal	  Market,	  OJ	  L	  178/1	  (2000).	  	  
contains	   requirements	   for	   intermediary	   liability	   for	   copyright	   infringement	   in	  Article	  15.11.27,	  and	  is	  closely	  modelled	  on	  US	  DMCA’s	  liability	  provisions.16	  	  Given	   the	   international	   prevalence	   of	   this	   principle,	   our	   discussion	   should	   end	  right	  here,	  at	  least	  for	  those	  countries	  that	  have	  enacted	  limits	  for	  responsibility	  for	  illegal	  content.	  The	  law	  is	  very	  clear,	  there	  are	  safeguards	  for	  content	  owners,	  and	  there	  appear	  to	  be	  very	  little	  room	  for	  interpretation,	  with	  the	  exception	  of	  some	  border	  cases,	  and	  perhaps	  to	  try	  to	  delimit	  some	  of	  the	  concepts	  a	  bit	  more.	  But	   unfortunately	   (or	   fortunately,	   depending	   on	   your	   point	   of	   view),	   the	  legislation	   described	   above	   has	   not	   stopped	   the	   debate.	   For	   some	   years	   now,	  regulators	  and	  industry	  have	  been	  trying	  to	  re-­‐open	  the	  question	  of	  liability.	  	  This	   has	   been	   some	   time	   coming.	   After	   intermediaries	   were	   given	   an	   almost	  blank	   cheque	   to	   operate	   with	   immunity,	   interested	   parties	   tried	   to	   find	   other	  ways	   to	   curb	   illicit	   practices	   online,	   particularly	   Internet	   piracy.	   This	   led	   to	   a	  series	   of	   attempts	   to	   destroy	   the	  makers	   of	   software	   that	  made	   it	   possible	   to	  exchange	   files,	   a	   strategy	   that	  had	  varying	   levels	  of	   success	   in	   the	   courts,17	  but	  which	   failed	   to	   stop	   online	   copyright	   infringement.	   Then	   there	   were	   several	  misguided	  and	  eventually	   failed	  attempts	  to	  pursue	  customers	  directly	  through	  litigation,18	  but	  needless	  to	  say,	  an	  industry	  that	  decides	  that	  its	  only	  avenue	  for	  survival	   is	   to	   sue	   its	  own	  consumers	   is	  not	   going	   to	   reap	  much	   sympathy,	   and	  such	  strategies	  tend	  to	  backfires.	  Throughout	  this	  time,	  the	  consensus	  remained	  that	  in	  general	  it	  would	  be	  difficult	  for	  any	  Internet	  service	  provider	  to	  monitor	  and	   filter	   every	   transaction	   performed	   by	   their	   customers,	   and	   therefore	   the	  respect	  for	  limitation	  of	  liability	  held.	  	  	  Fast-­‐forward	  some	  years,	  and	  the	  picture	  changed	  immensely.	  In	  the	  early	  days	  of	  the	  Internet,	  intermediaries	  used	  to	  be	  small	  and	  medium	  operations	  that	  did	  not	  have	  enough	  money	  to	  pay	  back	  in	  case	  of	  litigation.	  But	  with	  the	  appearance	  of	   large	   aggregated	   services	   such	   as	   Google,	   the	   possibility	   of	   making	   these	  providers	   liable	  became	  greater.	  The	  cluster	  of	   lawsuits	  against	  Google	  that	  we	  have	   witnessed	   in	   the	   last	   few	   years	   has	   been	   the	   result	   of	   this	   change	   in	  strategy.	   However,	   service	   providers	   are	   still	   protected	   by	   safe	   harbours	   and	  other	  liability	  dampeners.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  16	  Brown	  A,	  Guadamuz	  A,	  and	  Hatcher	  J,	  “The	  Impact	  of	  Free	  Trade	  Agreements	  on	  Information	  Technology	  Based	  Business”,	  2:1	  Geopolitics,	  History,	  and	  International	  Relations	  62	  (2010).	  	  17	  See	   US	   cases	   such	   as	   A&M	   Records	   v	   Napster,	   2002	   U.S.	   App.	   LEXIS	   4752;	   In	   re	   Aimster	  
Copyright	   Litig.,	   2004	   U.S.	   App.	   LEXIS	   1449;	  Metro-­‐Goldwyn-­‐Mayer	   Studios	   Inc.	   v	   Grokster,	   Ltd.,	  125	   S.	   Ct.	   2764;	   and	   the	   Australian	   case	  Universal	  Music	  Australia	   v	   Sharman	  License	  Holdings	  [2005]	  FCA	  1242.	  	  18	  Hughes	   J,	   "On	   the	   Logic	   of	   Suing	   One's	   Customers	   and	   the	   Dilemma	   of	   Infringement-­‐Based	  Business	  Models",	  22	  Cardozo	  Arts	  &	  Entertainment	  Law	  Journal	  725	  (2005).	  
3.	  If	  at	  first	  you	  fail,	  try	  and	  try	  again	  
3.1	  L’Oreal	  Given	   the	   clarity	   of	   the	   law,	   it	   may	   seem	   surprising	   that	   there	   would	   still	   be	  anyone	   intent	   on	   collecting	   money	   from	   intermediaries.	   But	   this	   is	   precisely	  what	  took	  place	  in	  many	  jurisdictions.	  	  One	  of	  the	  most	  important	  European	  cases	  dealing	  with	  the	  question	  has	  nothing	  to	  do	  with	  copyright,	  but	  rather	   trade	  mark;	   it	   is	   the	  European	  Court	  of	   Justice	  case	  of	  L’Oréal	  v	  eBay.19	  The	  case	  was	  brought	  by	  cosmetic	  manufacturer	  L’Oreal	  against	   the	   large	   auctions	   website	   eBay	   for	   the	   actions	   of	   distributors	   of	  unauthorised	   sampler	   products,	   who	   removed	   the	   sampler	   package	   and	   then	  sold	  the	  products	  on	  the	  site.	  The	  question	  at	  the	  heart	  of	  the	  case	  was	  whether	  eBay	   can	   be	   held	   liable	   for	   trade	  mark	   infringement	   committed	   by	  merchants	  operating	   in	   its	   website.	   A	   simple	   reading	   of	   the	   aforementioned	   Electronic	  Commerce	  Directive	  would	   indicate	   that	   they	   are	  not,	   but	   the	   facts	  of	   the	   case	  complicated	  the	  issue	  somewhat.	  While	  it	  seems	  like	  eBay	  is	  not	  to	  be	  held	  liable	  for	  whatever	   is	   sold	  on	   its	  site	  by	   third	  parties,	  eBay	  allowed	   the	  placement	  of	  sponsored	   links	   to	   infringing	   products.	   It	   also	   included	   the	   unauthorised	  merchants	   to	   include	   listings	   under	   the	   affected	  marks,	   in	   other	  words,	   if	   you	  looked	   under	   L’Oreal	   you	   would	   find	   both	   authorised	   and	   unauthorised	  distributors.	   Moreover,	   infringing	   merchants	   could	   purchase	   Google	   Adwords	  and	  other	  keyword	  search	  engine	  placement	  that	  directed	  to	  the	  pages	  on	  eBay.	  The	  question	  then	  was	  whether	  these	  actions	  warranted	  liability.	  The	  High	  Court	  of	  England	  decided	  the	  case	  at	  an	  earlier	  stage	  in	  2009.20	  Arnold	  J	  found	  that	  there	  had	  been	  indeed	  trade	  mark	  infringement	  committed	  by	  some	  of	  the	  co-­‐defendants	  by	  trading	  on	  sampler	  and	  de-­‐marked	  goods	  on	  the	  site.	  He	  also	  ruled	  that	  eBay	  was	  not	  jointly	  liable	  for	  infringement,	  which	  was	  consistent	  with	   the	   prevalent	   principle	   of	   limitation	   of	   intermediary	   liability.	   However,	  Arnold	  J	  referred	  some	  important	  questions	  to	  the	  ECJ,	  some	  of	  which	  dealt	  with	  specifics	  of	  trade	  mark	  law	  and	  with	  injunctions.	  	  The	   relevant	   question	   regarding	   intermediary	   liability	   asked	   shether	   eBay	  Europe	  had	  a	  defence	  under	  Art.	  14	  of	   the	  E-­‐Commerce	  Directive.	  Article	  14	  of	  the	   E-­‐Commerce	   Directive	   gives	   a	   specific	   defence	   regarding	   hosting,	   which	  states	  that	  an	  information	  service	  provider	  that	  provides	  “storage	  of	  information	  provided	  by	  a	  recipient	  of	  the	  service”	  will	  not	  be	  held	  liable	  if	  the	  provider	  does	  not	   have	   knowledge	   of	   the	   illegal	   activity,	   and	   upon	   being	  made	   aware	   of	   the	  existence	  of	  any	  illicit	  content	  in	  its	  storage	  facilities,	  it	  removes	  it	  promptly,	  or	  disables	  access	  to	  it.	  	  The	   ECJ	   produced	   an	   interesting	   ruling	   that	   both	   maintains	   the	   principles	   of	  intermediary	  liability,	  but	  finds	  that	  some	  of	  eBay’s	  actions	  to	  fall	  outside	  of	  the	  general	   protection.	   Dealing	   with	   the	   issue	   of	   intermediary	   liability,	   the	   ECJ	  declared	  that	  the	  Art	  14(1)	  of	  the	  E-­‐Commerce	  Directive	  must	  be	  interpreted	  as	  applying	   to	   the	   operator	   of	   an	   online	   marketplace	   if	   they	   have	   not	   had	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  19	  L’Oréal	  SA	  and	  Others	  v	  eBay	  International	  AG	  and	  Others	  C-­‐324/09.	  	  	  20	  L’Oreal	  SA	  &	  Ors	  v	  EBay	  International	  AG	  &	  Ors	  [2009]	  EWHC	  1094.	  	  	  
knowledge	  or	  control	  over	   the	  data	  stored	  on	   its	  site.	  However,	   if	   the	  operator	  plays	   a	   role	   that	   provides	   assistance,	   then	   it	   might	   not	   be	   covered	   by	   the	  exemption	  from	  liability	  “if	  it	  was	  aware	  of	  facts	  or	  circumstances	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  which	  a	  diligent	  economic	  operator	  should	  have	  realised	  that	  the	  offers	  for	  sale	  in	   question	  were	   unlawful”,	   and	   also	   failed	   to	   act	   expeditiously	   to	   remove	   the	  content.	  	  This	  is	  a	  very	  interesting	  test.	  If	  an	  Internet	  intermediary	  plays	  an	  active	  role	  in	  assisting	  people	  to	  optimise	  the	  presentation	  of	  an	  infringing	  product,	  then	  they	  might	  be	  held	   liable.	  However,	  even	   if	   the	   intermediary	  did	  not	  play	  any	  active	  role	   in	   presenting	   the	   goods,	   they	  might	   still	   be	   held	   liable	   if	   they	   could	   have	  known	  that	  the	  goods	  offered	  were	  unlawful.	  Unfortunately,	  there	  seems	  to	  be	  no	  determination	   as	   to	   volume	   of	   transactions,	   so	   it	   might	   be	   difficult	   for	   an	  operator	   to	  be	  able	   to	  know	  the	   legality	  of	  an	   item	  when	   it	  handles	  millions	  of	  transactions	  per	  day.	  	  The	  truth	  is	  that	  the	  L’Oreal	  case	  has	  given	  us	  a	  reasonable	  test	  for	  liability,	  but	  also	  has	  set	  the	  boundaries	  of	  the	  actions	  that	  an	  intermediary	  has	  to	  perform	  in	  order	  to	  be	  held	  responsible	  for	  content	  posted	  by	  its	  users.	  	  
3.1	  iiNet	  To	  contrast	  what	  is	  happening	  in	  Europe	  and	  the	  US,	  we	  have	  to	  look	  at	  a	  country	  that	   does	   not	   have	   the	   same	   level	   of	   limits	   placed	   on	   legal	   accountability	   of	  service	  providers.	  Australia	  does	  not	  have	   in	  place	  any	  regime	  that	  mirrors	  the	  DMCA’s	   safe	   harbours,	   or	   the	   EU’s	   E-­‐Commerce	   Directive.	   According	   to	  Australian	  commentators,	  the	  type	  of	  defences	  and	  safe	  harbours	  available	  under	  its	  Copyright	  Act	   are	  extremely	   limited,	   tremendously	   complicated,	   and	  mostly	  inadequate	   to	   ensure	   that	   access	   providers	   can	   successfully	   conduct	   their	  business	  without	  fear	  of	  being	  sued	  for	  copyright	  infringement.21	  	  Australian	  courts	  were	  asked	  to	  test	  intermediary	  liability	  in	  the	  landmark	  case	  of	  Roadshow	  v	   iiNet.22	  iiNet	   is	   an	  Australian	   internet	   service	   provider	   that	  was	  sued	   in	   2008	   for	   authorisation23	  of	   copyright	   infringement	   by	   Australian	   film	  producer	   Roadshow	   Films	   and	   a	   conglomerate	   of	   international	   film	   producers	  including	  Warner,	   Columbia,	   20th	   Century,	   and	   Sony	   Pictures.	  The	   question	   at	  the	  heart	  of	  the	  proceeding	  is	  typical	  of	  the	  many	  cases	  described	  above,	  and	  it	  was	  whether	  an	  ISP	  is	  to	  be	  held	  liable	  for	  the	  copyright	  infringement	  committed	  by	   its	   customers.	  The	   case	  was	   decided	   in	   first	   instance	   in	   2010,	   and	   then	   the	  plaintiffs	   appealed	   to	   the	  Australian	  Federal	  Court,	  which	  denied	   the	  appeal	   in	  2010.	  	  	  At	  first	  glance	  the	  case	  might	  seem	  to	  lack	  relevance	  to	  an	  international	  analysis	  of	   intermediary	   liability	   because,	   as	   it	   has	   been	  mentioned,	   Australia	   has	   little	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  21	  Weatherall	   K,	   Internet	   Intermediaries	  and	  Copyright:	  An	  Australian	  Agenda	   for	  Reform.	   Policy	  Paper	  for	  the	  Australian	  Digital	  Alliance	  (2011),	  http://bit.ly/140eh0b.	  	  	  22	  Roadshow	  Films	  Pty	  Limited	  v	  iiNet	  Limited	  [2011]	  FCAFC	  23.	  	  23	  The	  Australian	  figure	  is	  a	  type	  of	  secondary	  liability	  for	  sanction,	  approval	  and	  countenance	  of	  an	   infringing	   act.	   See:	   Napthali	   M,	   "Unauthorised:	   Some	   thoughts	   upon	   the	   doctrine	   of	  authorisation	   of	   copyright	   infringement	   in	   the	   peer-­‐to-­‐peer	   age",	   16	   Australian	   Intellectual	  Property	  Journal	  5	  (2005).	  
limitation	   of	   responsibility	   for	   ISPs.	   Similarly,	   the	   case	   is	   unique	   because	  Australian	   copyright	   law	   holds	   secondary	   infringement	   as	   direct	  infringement.	  	  In	  other	  words,	  anyone	  making	  available	  copyright	  works	  will	  be	  held	  similarly	  liable,	  whether	  they	  do	  so	  directly	  or	  indirectly.	  Nonetheless,	  iiNet	  is	  interesting	  precisely	  because	  it	  shows	  what	  the	  legal	  landscape	  may	  look	  like	  without	   existing	   safe	   harbours.	   It	   is	   also	   quite	   an	   illustrating	   case	   from	   a	  technical	  and	  legal	  standpoint	  because	  it	  contains	  some	  detailed	  legal	  analysis	  of	  file-­‐sharing	  technologies.	  	  In	  the	  first	  instance24	  Cowdroy	  J	  explores	  several	  issues,	  but	  accurately	  identifies	  that	  the	  case	  hinges	  on	  two	  simple	  questions.	  	  Have	  the	  iiNet	  customers	  infringed	  copyright	   directly?	  	   The	   answer	   is	   unequivocally	   yes.	  	  Has	   iiNet	   authorised	   the	  copyright	   infringement	   of	   its	   users	   by	   failing	   to	   take	   steps	   to	   stop	   it	   from	  happening?	  Here	  the	  answer	  is	  no.	  The	  judge	  considers	  that	  there	  is	  a	  very	  clear	  distinction	   between	   an	   ISP,	   which	   “simply	   cannot	   be	   seen	   as	   sanctioning,	  approving	   or	   countenancing	   copyright	   infringement”,25 	  and	   the	   producer	   of	  software	  designed	  specifically	  to	  authorise	  copyright	   infringement,	  such	  as	  P2P	  software	  manufacturers	   like	  Kazaa	  and	  Napster.	  Based	  on	  this,	   the	   judge	   found	  that	   iiNet	   had	   not	   authorised	   copyright	   infringement,	   and	   therefore	   was	   not	  liable.	   Interestingly	   enough,	   the	   judge	  was	   asked	   to	   explore	  whether	   iiNet	   fell	  under	  the	  protection	  of	  the	  limited	  safe	  harbour	  provisions	  present	  in	  Australian	  copyright	   law,26	  and	   found	   that	   they	  would	   indeed	   satisfy	   those	   requirements,	  but	  that	  they	  did	  not	  need	  such	  protection	  because	  there	  was	  no	  authorisation,	  in	  other	  words,	  there	  was	  no	  secondary	  liability.	  	  The	  film	  studios	  appealed	  the	  decision,	  which	  was	  denied	  by	  the	  Federal	  Court,	  although	   their	   reasoning	  was	  different.	  As	  with	   the	   ruling	   in	   first	   instance,	   the	  matter	   came	   precisely	   to	   the	   question	   of	  whether	   or	   not	   iiNet	   had	   authorised	  copyright	   infringement	   committed	   by	   its	   customers.	   The	   Federal	   Court	  concluded	  that	  there	  is	  no	  authorisation,	  but	  commented:	  
“However,	   while	   the	   evidence	   supports	   a	   conclusion	   that	   iiNet	  
demonstrated	   a	   dismissive	   and,	   indeed,	   contumelious,	   attitude	   to	   the	  
complaints	  of	  infringement	  by	  the	  use	  of	  its	  services,	  its	  conduct	  did	  not	  
amount	  to	  authorisation	  of	  the	  primary	  acts	  of	  infringement	  on	  the	  part	  
of	  iiNet	  users.”27	  	  The	  court	  found	  that	  content	  owners	  would	  have	  to	  meet	  a	  high	  threshold	  level	  of	   infringement	   in	   similar	   cases	   in	   the	   future,	   although	   the	   court	   left	   open	   the	  possibility	  of	  similar	   litigation	  as	  every	  situation	  will	  have	   to	  be	  analysed	  as	   to	  whether	  the	  court	  has	  done	  enough	  to	  prevent	  infringement.	  	  Despite	   the	   above	   cases,	   limitation	  of	   liability	   for	   intermediaries	  has	   remained	  the	  norm	  in	  most	   jurisdictions	  where	   it	  has	  been	   implemented,	  and	  with	  a	   few	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  24	  Roadshow	  Films	  Pty	  Limited	  v	  iiNet	  Limited	  [2010]	  FCA	  24.	  	  25	  Ibid,	  para	  14.	  	  26	  Included	  in	  Division	  2AA	  of	  Part	  V	  of	  the	  Copyright	  Act	  1968.	  	  27	  FCAFC	  appeal,	  at	  para	  257.	  	  
exceptions, 28 	  service	   providers	   have	   managed	   to	   remain	   relatively	   free	   to	  operate	  without	  fears	  of	  overwhelming	  litigation.	  Content	  owners	  then	  have	  had	  to	  pursue	  other	  strategies.	  	  	  
4.	  Blocking	  and	  filtering	  
4.1	  European	  cases	  Given	   the	   limitations	   in	   place	   that	   favour	   ISPs	   and	   other	   mediators,	   some	  elements	   of	   the	   copyright	   industry	   tried	   to	   find	   other	   ways	   that	   would	   allow	  them	  to	  target	  intermediaries,	  but	  in	  ways	  that	  would	  not	  fall	  foul	  of	  the	  existing	  rules.	  One	  of	  the	  ways	  of	  doing	  this	  would	  be	  to	  target	  ISPs	  with	  injunctions,	  but	  not	  to	  remove	  content	  as	  such,	  but	  to	  try	  to	  implement	  the	  filtering	  and	  blocking	  of	   infringing	   materials	   with	   the	   intention	   of	   impeding	   it	   from	   ever	   reaching	  customers.	  	  This	   follows	   a	   type	   of	   Internet	   regulation	   that	   has	   been	   called	   control	   of	   the	  chokepoints 29 	  This	   idea	   is	   behind	   some	   of	   the	   most	   successful	   (and	  controversial)	  regulatory	  solutions	  of	   the	   last	  decade,	  which	   includes	   the	  Great	  Firewall	  in	  China,30	  and	  the	  Internet	  Watch	  Foundation	  (IWF)31	  in	  the	  UK.	  While	  the	  efficiency	  of	  filtering	  and	  blocking	  is	  still	  under	  discussion,	  there	  seems	  to	  be	  little	  doubt	  that,	  at	  least	  to	  a	  certain	  extent,	  some	  amount	  of	  filtering	  can	  indeed	  avoid	  content	  from	  reaching	  some	  target	  audiences.	  The	  IWF	  for	  example	  deals	  specifically	  with	  the	  blocking	  in	  the	  UK	  of	  child	  pornography	  by	  the	  identification	  of	  URLs	   that	   lead	   to	   illegal	   content.	  This	   creates	  a	   list	   that	   is	   sent	   to	   ISPs,	  who	  voluntarily	  block	  access	  to	  those	  sites.32	  	  Getting	  repressive	  countries	  to	  filter	  content,	  and	  getting	  ISPs	  to	  make	  efforts	  to	  block	   child	   pornography	   is	   one	   thing.	   Can	   the	   copyright	   industry	   manage	   to	  make	  ISPs	  into	  content	  filters?	  	  This	  possibility	  was	  explored	  at	   length	  in	  the	  long-­‐running	  ECJ	  case	  of	  Scarlet	  v	  
SABAM.33	  The	   Belgian	   Society	   of	   Authors,	   Composers,	   and	   Publishers	   (SABAM)	  initiated	  the	  case	   in	  2004	  against	  service	  provider	  Tiscali	   (which	   later	  changed	  its	   name	   to	   Scarlet).	   SABAM	   alleged	   Tiscali’s	   users	  were	   illegally	   downloading	  works	  in	  its	  catalogue	  from	  the	  Internet	  via	  P2P	  networks,	  and	  wanted	  Tiscali	  to	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  28	  See	  for	  example	  a	  recent	  case	  in	  an	  Amsterdam	  court	  where	  a	  USENET	  intermediary	  received	  an	   injunction	   to	   remove	   content	   posted	   by	   users.	   See:	   Crinjs	   K,	   “Dutch	   BREIN	   wins	   lawsuit	  against	   major	   European	   Usenet	   Provider”,	   Future	   of	   Copyright	   (October	   1st,	   2011),	  http://bit.ly/12q4lzV.	  	  	  29	  Goldsmith	   JL	   and	   Wu	   T,	  Who	   Controls	   the	   Internet?	   Illusions	   of	   a	   Borderless	  World,	   Oxford:	  Oxford	  University	  Press	  (2006).	  	  30	  Stevenson	   C,	   "Breaching	   the	   Great	   Firewall:	   China's	   Internet	   Censorship	   and	   the	   Quest	   for	  Freedom	  of	  Expression	   in	  a	  Connected	  World"	  30	  Boston	  College	  International	  and	  Comparative	  
Law	  Review	  531	  (2007).	  31	  Laidlaw	  E,	  “The	  Responsibilities	  of	  Free	  Speech	  Regulators:	  An	  Analysis	  of	  the	  Internet	  Watch	  Foundation”	  20	  International	  Journal	  of	  Law	  and	  Information	  Technology	  312	  (2012).	  32	  Edwards	  L,	  “From	  Child	  Porn	  to	  China,	  In	  One	  Cleanfeed”,	  3:3	  SCRIPTed	  174	  (2006).	  	  33	  Scarlet	  Extended	  SA	  v	  Société	  belge	  des	  auteurs,	  compositeurs	  et	  éditeurs	  SCRL	  (SABAM)	  C-­‐70/10.	  	  
install	   filtering	   software	   in	   its	   network	   that	   would	   curb	   further	   infringement.	  The	  first	  ruling	  in	  the	  District	  Court	  of	  Brussels	  agreed	  with	  the	  claimants	  based	  entirely	   on	   expert	   reports	   about	   the	   feasibility	   of	   deploying	   filtering	   systems.	  The	  expert	  argued	  that	  there	  were	  at	  least	  thirteen	  systems	  capable	  of	  effectively	  filtering	   P2P	   transmissions,	   seven	   of	   which	   could	   be	   deployed	   in	   Tiscali’s	  servers.	  Tiscali’s	  response	  was	  that	   these	  solutions	  were	  partial	  and	   ineffective	  at	  best,	  as	  P2P	  clients	  are	  increasingly	  becoming	  more	  difficult	  to	  filter	  because	  of	  encryption	  technology.	  	  Unsurprisingly,	  the	  decision	  was	  appealed.	  The	  Brussels	  Court	  of	  Appeals	  rightly	  realised	   that	   this	   went	   beyond	   the	   limitation	   of	   liability	   contained	   in	   the	   E-­‐Commerce	   Directive,	   and	   there	   was	   a	   chance	   that	   there	   might	   be	   a	   conflict	  between	   the	   Copyright	   Directive	   2001/29, 34 	  the	   IP	   Enforcement	   Directive	  2004/48, 35 	  the	   Data	   Protection	   Directive	   95/46, 36 	  the	   Electronic	   Privacy	  Directive	   2002/58,37	  and	   Articles	   8	   and	   10	   of	   the	   European	   Convention	   on	  Human	  Rights	  (ECHR).	  The	  referring	  court	  sought	  guidance	  on	  whether	  it	  would	  be	   possible	   for	   a	   national	   court	   to	   order	   putting	   in	   place	   by	   injunction	   a	  widespread	   and	   indiscriminate	   filtering	   system	  which	   would	   require	   constant	  monitoring	  at	  the	  expense	  of	  the	  ISP,	  as	  it	  might	  violate	  fundamental	  rights	  and	  freedoms	  enshrined	  in	  various	  directives	  and	  conventions,	  and	  if	  so,	  if	  such	  relief	  would	   have	   to	   respect	   principles	   of	   proportionality.	   The	   Belgian	   court	   was	  clearly	   troubled	   by	   the	   implications	   of	   enacting	   such	   a	   system	   without	   a	  substantive	   ruling,	   and	   that	   copyright	   owners	   would	   be	   able	   to	   impose	   great	  costs	  to	  ISPs	  simply	  by	  asking	  it	  via	  injunctive	  relief.	  	  The	   ECJ	   answered	   that	   indeed	   a	   copyright	   filtering	   injunction	   would	   create	   a	  clash	  with	  other	  legal	  principles.	  It	  became	  clear	  from	  the	  start	  that	  the	  ECJ	  was	  not	   amenable	   to	   rule	   in	   favour	   of	   indiscriminate	   monitoring,	   as	   it	   would	   go	  against	   Art.	   15	   of	   the	   E-­‐Commerce	   Directive,	   which,	   as	   has	   been	   mentioned,	  states	   unequivocally	   that	   Member	   States	   shall	   not	   require	   intermediaries	   to	  monitor	   the	   information	   which	   they	   transmit	   or	   store.	   Any	   filtering	   system	  would	  be	  in	  violation	  of	  this	  rule,	  as	  it	  would	  require	  the	  following	  acts	  from	  the	  ISP:	  
“–	  first,	  that	  the	  ISP	  identify,	  within	  all	  of	  the	  electronic	  communications	  
of	   all	   its	   customers,	   the	   files	   relating	   to	   peer-­‐to-­‐peer	   traffic;	  
–	  secondly,	  that	  it	  identify,	  within	  that	  traffic,	  the	  files	  containing	  works	  
in	  respect	  of	  which	  holders	  of	  intellectual-­‐property	  rights	  claim	  to	  hold	  
rights;	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  34	  Directive	  2001/29/EC	  of	   the	  European	  Parliament	  and	  of	   the	  Council	  of	  22	  May	  2001	  on	  the	  harmonisation	  of	  certain	  aspects	  of	  copyright	  and	  related	  rights	   in	  the	  information	  society	  OJ	  L	  167/10	  (2001).	  	  35	  Directive	  2004/48/EC	  of	  the	  European	  Parliament	  and	  of	  the	  Council	  of	  29	  April	  2004	  on	  the	  enforcement	  of	  intellectual	  property	  rights	  OJ	  L	  157/16	  (2004).	  	  	  36	  Directive	  95/46/EC	  of	  the	  European	  Parliament	  and	  of	  the	  Council	  of	  24	  October	  1995	  on	  the	  protection	   of	   individuals	   with	   regard	   to	   the	   processing	   of	   personal	   data	   and	   on	   the	   free	  movement	  of	  such	  data	  OJ	  L	  281/31	  (1995).	  	  37	  Directive	   2002/58/EC	   of	   the	   European	   Parliament	   and	   of	   the	   Council	   of	   12	   July	   2002	  concerning	   the	   processing	   of	   personal	   data	   and	   the	   protection	   of	   privacy	   in	   the	   electronic	  communications	  sector	  OJ	  L	  201/37	  (2002).	  	  
–	   thirdly,	   that	   it	   determine	   which	   of	   those	   files	   are	   being	   shared	  
unlawfully;	  and	  
–	  fourthly,	  that	  it	  block	  file	  sharing	  that	  it	  considers	  to	  be	  unlawful.”	  Moreover,	   the	   court	   stated	   that	   rights	   protected	   under	   intellectual	   property	  legislation	   are	   indeed	   enshrined	   in	   the	   Charter	   of	   Fundamental	   Rights	   of	   the	  European	   Union,	   but	   that	   these	   rights	   are	   not	   absolute,	   and	   must	   be	   read	   in	  conjunction	  with	  other	   legislation.	   Specifically	   citing	   the	  Promusicae	   case,38	  the	  court	  commented	  that	  the	  protection	  of	  IP	  rights	  “must	  be	  balanced	  against	  the	  protection	   of	   other	   fundamental	   rights”,	   and	   that	   “in	   the	   context	   of	   measures	  adopted	  to	  protect	  copyright	  holders,	  national	  authorities	  and	  courts	  must	  strike	  a	   fair	   balance	   between	   the	   protection	   of	   copyright	   and	   the	   protection	   of	   the	  fundamental	  rights	  of	  individuals	  who	  are	  affected	  by	  such	  measures.”	  	  The	  ECJ	  then	  considered	  that	  there	  are	  fundamental	  rights	  that	  would	  be	  affected	  by	   the	   filtering	   system	   proposed	   by	   SABAM,	   namely	   the	   freedom	   to	   conduct	  business	   by	   the	   ISPs	   because	   the	   system	   would	   be	   costly,	   and	   that	   the	  intermediaries	  would	  solely	  foot	  this	  cost.	  To	  support	  this	  view,	  they	  stated	  that	  Art.	  3	  of	  the	  IP	  Enforcement	  Directive	  requires	  that	  IP	  remedies	  “shall	  be	  fair	  and	  equitable	   and	   shall	   not	   be	   unnecessarily	   complicated	   or	   costly,	   or	   entail	  unreasonable	  time-­‐limits	  or	  unwarranted	  delays”.	  	  For	  users,	  the	  filtering	  system	  would	  affect	  their	  “right	  to	  protection	  of	  their	  personal	  data	  and	  their	  freedom	  to	  receive	  or	  impart	  information”,	  protected	  by	  Arts.	  8	  and	  11	  of	  the	  ECHR.	  Finally,	  the	  ECJ	  opined	  that	  there	  were	  some	  serious	  procedural	  problems	  with	  a	  system	  that	  would	  be	  enacted	  by	  injunction	  for	  works	  that	  were	  not	  even	  created	  at	   the	  time	  that	   the	   injunction	  was	   issued.	  Nonetheless,	  specific	   injunctions	  are	  still	  allowed,	  what	  the	  ECJ	  ruled	  against	  was	  a	  blanket	  filtering	  system	  suggested	  by	  SABAM.	  The	  court	  created	  a	  checklist	  for	  similar	  future	  blocking	  requests:	  	  
“[The	  cited	  Directives]	   read	   together	  and	  construed	   in	   the	   light	  of	   the	  
requirements	   stemming	   from	   the	   protection	   of	   the	   applicable	  
fundamental	   rights,	   must	   be	   interpreted	   as	   precluding	   an	   injunction	  
made	  against	  an	  internet	  service	  provider	  which	  requires	  it	  to	  install	  a	  
system	  for	  filtering	  
− all	   electronic	   communications	   passing	   via	   its	   services,	   in	  
particular	  those	  involving	  the	  use	  of	  peer-­‐to-­‐peer	  software;	  
− which	   applies	   indiscriminately	   to	   all	   its	   customers;	  
as	  a	  preventive	  measure;	  
− exclusively	  at	  its	  expense;	  and	  
− for	  an	  unlimited	  period,	  
which	   is	   capable	   of	   identifying	   on	   that	   provider’s	   network	   the	  
movement	  of	  electronic	   files	  containing	  a	  musical,	  cinematographic	  or	  
audio-­‐visual	   work	   in	   respect	   of	   which	   the	   applicant	   claims	   to	   hold	  
intellectual-­‐property	  rights,	  with	  a	  view	  to	  blocking	  the	  transfer	  of	  files	  
the	  sharing	  of	  which	  infringes	  copyright.”	  This	   is	   a	   reasonable	   and	   interesting	   ruling	   that	   handles	  most	   of	   the	   balancing	  aspects	   of	   copyright	   enforcement,	   and	   sets	   the	   boundaries	   of	   what	   filtering	  should	  look	  like	  in	  the	  future.	  The	  ECJ	  reached	  a	  very	  similar	  solution	  in	  the	  case	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  38	  Productores	  de	  Música	  de	  España	  (Promusicae)	  v	  Telefónica	  de	  España	  SAU	  C-­‐275/06.	  	  
of	   SABAM	   v	   Netlog,39	  in	   a	   situation	   that	   closely	   mirrored	   the	   one	   covered	   in	  
Scarlet.	   Here,	   the	   Belgian	   collecting	   society	   sued	   a	   social	   network	   site	   named	  Netlog,	  attempting	  to	  obtain	  an	  injunction	  ordering	  it	  to	  install	  filtering	  software	  in	  its	  network.	  The	  site	  fought	  the	  injunction,	  and	  much	  as	  its	  predecessor	  case,	  it	  made	  it	  all	  the	  way	  to	  the	  ECJ,	  where	  the	  court	  followed	  its	  preceding	  reasoning	  closely,	   finding	   that	   indiscriminate	   filtering	   systems	   are	   contrary	   to	   the	  dispositions	   contained	   in	   the	   E-­‐Commerce	   Directive,	   and	   are	   also	  disproportionate.	  	  
4.2	  Blocking	  orders	  It	   might	   be	   surprising	   that	   given	   the	   high-­‐threshold	   test	   of	   the	   ECJ’s	   SABAM	  cases,	   several	   courts	   around	   Europe	   have	   been	   actually	   enforcing	   filtering	  against	  specific	  sites.	  Just	  to	  give	  one	  example,	  the	  popular	  tracker	  site	  The	  Pirate	  Bay	   has	   now	   been	   blocked	   in	   one	   way	   or	   another	   in	   at	   least	   12	   countries	   in	  Europe,	   including	   Italy,	   Sweden	   and	   Denmark.40	  It	   seems	   that	   the	   long-­‐term	  effect	  of	  SABAM	  is	  to	  allow	  targeted	  block	  orders	  against	  specific	  sites,	  a	  strategy	  that	   is	   perhaps	   not	   what	   content	   owners	   sought	   after,	   but	   that	   allows	   for	   a	  limited	  number	  of	  victories	  in	  the	  courts	  against	  specific	  sites.	  	  One	   of	   the	   most	   interesting	   developments	   has	   taken	   place	   in	   the	   UK,	   where	  copyright	   holders	   have	   successfully	   led	   a	   blocking	   campaign	   against	   various	  torrent-­‐tracking	  sites.	  	  The	  story	  began	  with	  the	  case	  of	  Twentieth	  Century	  Fox	  &	  Others	  v	  Newzbin.41	  The	  case	   originated	   when	   several	   Hollywood	   film	   studios	   sued	   Newzbin,	   a	   then	  popular	   filesharing	   site,	   for	   copyright	   infringement	   by	   communicating	   to	   the	  public.42	  Newzbin	   operated	   a	   subscription	   service	   that	   encouraged	   its	   users	   to	  share	  all	  manners	  of	  content,	  and	  therefore	  the	  court	  found	  it	  quite	  easy	  to	  get	  a	  ruling	   that	   the	   site’s	   operators	  were	   liable	   directly	   for	   copyright	   infringement.	  During	  the	  trial,	  the	  defendants	  tried	  to	  argue	  that	  they	  were	  a	  service	  provider	  and	   therefore	   were	   not	   liable	   for	   copyright	   infringement	   committed	   by	   its	  customers.	  The	   judge	  disagreed,	  as	   it	  was	  evident	   that	   the	  owners	  had	   specific	  knowledge	  of	  the	  infringement	  that	  was	  taking	  place	  on	  the	  site.	  	  With	  a	  solid	  copyright	  infringement	  result	  in	  hand,	  the	  plaintiffs	  sought	  to	  obtain	  an	  order	  to	  get	  British	  Telecommunications	  (BT)	  to	  filter	  content	  from	  Newzbin,	  and	   the	   High	   Court	   of	   England	   and	   Wales	   acquiesced	   by	   instating	   a	   court-­‐mandated	  system	  of	  Internet	  filtering	  against	  Newzbin.	  43	  The	  studios	  sought	  this	  order	   as	   they	   argued	   that	   it	  was	   the	   only	  way	   in	  which	   they	  would	  be	   able	   to	  implement	   the	  substantive	  ruling.	  The	  High	  Court	  agreed	  with	   the	  studios,	  and	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  39 	  Belgische	   Vereniging	   van	   Auteurs,	   Componisten	   en	   Uitgevers	   CVBA	   (SABAM)	   v	   Netlog	   NV	  C‑360/10.	  	  40	  See	   for	   example,	  Bergamo	  Public	   Prosecutor's	  Officer	   v	  Kolmisappi	   (Italian	   Supreme	   Court	   of	  Cassation,	   29	   Sept	   2009);	   Columbia	   Pictures	   Industries	   Inc	   v	   Portlane	   AB	   (Swedish	   Court	   of	  Appeal,	  4	  May	  2010);	  and	  IFPI	  Danmark	  v	  DMT2	  A/S	  (Frederiksberg	  Court,	  29	  October	  2008).	  	  41	  Twentieth	  Century	  Fox	  Film	  Corporation	  &	  Anor	  v	  Newzbin	  Ltd	  [2010]	  EWHC	  608.	  	  42	  Contemplated	  in	  s20	  of	  the	  Copyright,	  Designs	  and	  Patents	  Act	  1988.	  	  43	  Twentieth	  Century	  Fox	  Film	  Corp	  &	  Ors	  v	  British	  Telecommunications	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BT	   was	   forced	   to	   technically	   block	   access	   from	   its	   customers	   to	   the	   Newzbin	  website.	  Kitchin	  J	  ruled	  that	  he	  accepted	  the	  suggested	  order	  from	  the	  studios.	  	  The	   reasoning	   used	   to	   issue	   the	   blocking	   order	   relies	   heavily	   on	   technical	  grounds.	   The	   High	   Court	   took	   into	   consideration	   the	   existence	   of	   a	   voluntary	  service	  such	  as	  the	  IWF	  as	  evidence	  that	  the	  blocking	  of	  IP	  addresses	  is	  possible.	  This	   line	   of	   argument	   follows	   that	   if	   it	   is	   possible	   to	   restrict	   access	   to	   child	  pornography,	   then	   it	   is	   also	   possible	   to	   do	   the	   same	   for	   some	   copyright	  infringing	  sites	  like	  Newzbin.	  	  Unfortunately,	   the	   court	   really	   failed	   to	   properly	   address	   the	   efficiency	   of	  filtering	  and	  blocking	  orders,	  which	  should	  have	  played	  a	  much	  stronger	  part	  of	  any	   legal	   ruling	   dealing	  with	   this	   subject.	   If	   the	   objective	   of	   the	   plaintiffs	   is	   to	  block	  access	  from	  UK	  customers	  to	  a	  specific	  infringing	  site,	  having	  this	  judicial	  order	  is	  not	  going	  to	  help,	  there	  are	  several	  ways	  in	  which	  the	  order	  can	  be	  easily	  circumvented.	   	  The	  movie	  studios	  and	  the	  Court	  seemed	  to	  know	  this,	  but	  they	  went	  ahead	  nonetheless,	  as	  there	  are	  strong	  hints	  that	  the	  ruling	  has	  the	  ultimate	  objective	  of	  providing	  an	  example	  to	  others.	  The	  Court	  seems	  uninterested	  in	  the	  efficiency	   of	   the	   order,	   what	   is	   important	   is	   that	   a	   message	   is	   sent	   to	   other	  operators	  and	  potential	  infringers.	  	  Interestingly,	   the	   Newzbin	   ruling	   came	   before	   SABAM	   case	   had	   been	   decided,	  and	   therefore	   the	   Court	   only	   had	   a	   translation	   of	   the	   opinion	   of	   the	   Advocate	  General	  to	  go	  by	  before	  the	  court	  had	  made	  its	  decision.	  This	  might	  be	  the	  reason	  why	   the	   actual	   legal	   content	   of	   the	   case	   tends	   to	   ignore	   the	   considerations	  contained	   in	   SABAM	   that	   have	   already	   been	   explained	   above,	   and	   issued	   the	  blocking	  order	  regardless.	  	  The	  result	  of	  the	  Newzbin	  case	  was	  massive,	  as	  it	  opened	  the	  floodgates	  for	  other	  similar	   blocking	   orders.	   The	   next	   site	   in	   line	   was	   The	   Pirate	   Bay	   (TPB),	   the	  golden	  goose	  of	  torrent	  tracker	  providers.	  	  	  	  Given	   the	   precedents,	   it	   is	   unsurprising	   that	   the	   High	   Court	   ruled	   that	   UK	  Internet	  service	  providers	  must	  take	  steps	  to	  technically	  block	  access	  from	  their	  customers	  to	  The	  Pirate	  Bay.44	  Several	  recording	  companies	  and	  representatives	  of	   the	   music	   industry	   filed	   a	   suit	   against	   a	   number	   of	   ISPs	   to	   try	   to	   obtain	   a	  blocking	   injunction	   similar	   to	   the	   one	   obtained	   in	   Newzbin.	   There	   is	   a	   slight	  difference	  with	  what	  happened	  in	  that	  other	  case,	  as	  the	  music	  industry	  did	  not	  file	   a	   claim	   directly	   against	   TPB,	   but	   rather	   did	   it	   against	   the	   intermediaries	  without	   joining	   the	   defendants.	   The	   Court	   had	   to	   consider	   the	   infringement	  aspect	  of	  the	  case	  separately45	  before	  issuing	  the	  blocking	  order.	  	  There	   is	   very	   little	  meat	   in	   the	   actual	  wording	   of	   the	  decision.	   This	   is	   because	  most	  of	  the	  legal	  framework	  that	  sustains	  the	  order	  was	  undertaken	  in	  previous	  cases,	   namely	   in	   blocking	   access	   to	   Newzbin;	   and	   to	   a	   lesser	   extent	   in	   other	  similar	  cases	  such	  as	  Golden	  Eye	  v	  Telefónica.46	  The	  misapplication,	  and	  perhaps	  even	  complete	  bypassing	  of	  the	  two	  ECJ	  SABAM	  cases	  is	  baffling,	  with	  Newzbin	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  44	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  Ltd	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  Ltd	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  Ors	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  &	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  Ltd	  &	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  [2012]	  EWHC	  268	  (Ch).	  	  46	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  Ltd	  &	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  UK	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  [2012]	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there	  was	   reason	  as	   it	  precedes	   the	   first	   SABAM	  case,	  but	  with	  The	  Pirate	  Bay	  block,	   there	   really	   was	   no	   reason	   to	   ignore	   it.	   Talking	   about	   SABAM,	   and	   the	  conflicts	   of	   values	  with	   the	   human	   rights	   and	   the	   principle	   of	   proportionality,	  Arnold	   J	   opined	   that	   it	   had	   read	   the	   reasoning	   presented	   in	   both	   cases,	   and	  considered	  that	  it	  did	  not	  call	   into	  question	  the	  reasoning	  in	  Newzbin.	  This	  is	  a	  quick	   and	   disappointing	   dismissal	   of	   SABAM,	   which	   undoubtedly	   offers	   a	  detailed	   step-­‐by-­‐step	   test	   for	   future	   blocking	   orders.	   The	   problem	   is	   that	   both	  Newzbin	   and	   TPB	   orders	   ignore	   the	   balancing	   act	   displayed	   by	   the	   ECJ	   in	  SABAM,	  not	  only	  with	  regards	  to	  cost,	  but	  also	  when	  it	  considered	  human	  rights	  and	  data	  protection.	  The	  judge	  here	  displays	  a	  disregard	  for	  those	  arguments.	  	  Moreover,	   the	   legal	   issue	   in	   the	   TPB	   case	   rests	   on	   the	   question	   of	   whether	   a	  court	   has	   the	   power	   to	   order	   intermediaries	   to	   exercise	   technical	   blocking	   of	  specific	  websites	  where	  copyright	  infringement	  is	  taking	  place.	  As	  this	  question	  had	   already	   been	   answered	   positively	   in	   Newzbin,	   all	   that	   is	   required	   is	   for	   a	  judge	  to	  be	  convinced	  that	  a	  site	  is	  being	  used	  mostly	  for	  copyright	  infringement,	  and	  an	  order	  to	  block	  it	  can	  be	  issued.	  	  As	   it	  was	  pointed	  out	   above,	  TPB	  were	  not	   an	  actual	  party	  of	   the	  proceedings,	  there	   was	   surprisingly	   little	   consideration	   given	   to	   the	   matter	   of	   copyright	  infringement	  committed	  by	  The	  Pirate	  Bay	  and	  its	  customers.	  The	  reason	  for	  this	  is	  that	  the	  defendants	  in	  this	  case	  were	  several	  UK	  ISPs,	  and	  as	  such,	  they	  were	  really	   not	   interested	   in	   defending	  TPB.	  Arnold	   J	   seems	   content	   to	   simply	   state	  that	   TPB	   (and	   its	   users)	   infringe	   copyright	   given	   the	   evidence	   of	   the	   fact	  presented	  by	  the	  music	  industry.	  Therefore,	  there	  was	  no	  need	  to	  serve	  TPB	  with	  a	  notice	  because	  even	  the	  courts	  in	  Sweden	  were	  unable	  to	  reach	  them.	  	  Just	   as	   with	   Newzbin,	   the	   ruling	   relies	   heavily	   on	   the	   technical	   aspects	   of	   the	  order.	  Here	  Arnold	  J	  seems	  content	  once	  more	  to	  take	  the	  claims	  of	  the	  copyright	  holders	  and	  to	  gloss	  over	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  order	  will	  be	  easily	  circumvented.	  It	  is	  true	   that	   copyright	   enforcement	   mechanisms	   allow	   for	   the	   implementation	   of	  injunctions	  and	  court	  orders	   that	  will	   try	   to	  prevent	   further	   infringement	   from	  taking	  place.	  Blocking	  access	   to	  an	   infringing	  site	   is	   the	   logical	  next	  step	   in	   the	  legal	  fight	  against	  piracy.	  The	  problem	  that	  these	  orders	  are	  not	  very	  efficient	  is	  ignored.	  Presented	  with	  a	  block,	  those	  knowledgeable	  enough	  will	  simply	  bypass	  it.	  	  Despite	  these	  misgivings,	  it	  would	  appear	  that	  blocking	  orders	  are	  here	  to	  stay.	  In	  EMI	  Records	  v	  B	  Sky	  B,47	  the	  High	  Court	  of	  England	  and	  Wales	  produced	  a	  third	  high-­‐profile	  blocking	  order	  for	  UK	  ISPs	  against	  three	  popular	  torrent	  sites	  called	  KAT,	  H33T,	  and	  Fenopy.	   Just	  as	  with	  TPB,	  the	  action	  was	  brought	  by	  the	  music	  industry	  directly	  against	  the	  intermediaries	  and	  not	  against	  the	  site	  owners.	  	  The	  case	  is	  quite	  straightforward,	  as	  it	  follows	  closely	  the	  format	  established	  in	  Newzbin	   and	   The	   Pirate	   Bay.	   The	   ruling	   briefly	   discusses	   that	   the	   orders	   are	  deemed	  proportional	  given	  the	  seriousness	  of	  the	  offence,	  and	  declares	  that	  the	  court	   has	   jurisdiction	   over	   the	   case.	   Just	   like	   the	   decision	   against	   TPB,	   in	   this	  instance	  Arnold	   J	   goes	   into	   the	   substantive	   issue	  of	  whether	   there	   is	   copyright	  infringement	   taking	   place.	   One	   of	   the	   interesting	   parts	   of	   this	   ruling	   is	   that	   it	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  47	  EMI	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  &	  Ors	  v	  British	  Sky	  Broadcasting	  Ltd	  &	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clearly	  distinguishes	  the	  copyright	  liability	  of	  the	  users,	  and	  that	  of	  the	  operators	  of	  the	  tracker	  sites.	  	  In	  first	  instance,	  Arnold	  J	  examined	  that	  the	  users	  of	  the	  site	  are	  engaged	  in	  both	  direct	   copyright	   infringement,	   and	  also	   in	   communication	   to	   the	  public.	  This	   is	  hardly	   surprising,	   but	   as	   the	   copyright	   industry	   has	   been	   moving	   away	   from	  suing	   users,	   this	   fact	   is	   kept	   only	   as	   evidence	   that	   there	   is	   indeed	   copyright	  infringement	   going	   on	   in	   those	   sites.	   With	   regards	   to	   the	   operators	   for	   KAT,	  H33T	   and	   Fenopy,	   the	   claimants	   argued	   that	   they	   were	   liable	   for	   copyright	  infringement	   for	   three	   reasons.	   Firstly,	   the	   sites	   are	   indeed	   communicating	  protected	   works	   to	   the	   public,	   which	   makes	   them	   guilty	   of	   copyright	  infringement.	  Secondly,	  the	  ruling	  finds	  that	  the	  operators	  are	  guilty	  of	  the	  tort	  of	  authorising	   infringement,	   so	   the	   sites	   are	   jointly	   liable	   for	   infringement	  committed	   by	   their	   users.	   Thirdly,	   the	   operators	   of	   the	   sites	   have	   actual	  knowledge	   of	   the	   infringement,	   and	   base	   their	   business	  model	   on	   piracy.	   This	  weighs	  heavily	  on	  the	  issuing	  of	  blocking	  orders.	  	  All	  of	  the	  above	  is	  to	  be	  expected	  as	  it	  follows	  closely	  the	  line	  of	  reasoning	  that	  started	  with	  Newzbin.	  However,	  what	  makes	  this	  case	  particularly	  important	  for	  the	   purpose	   of	   this	   discussion	   is	   that	   it	   goes	   into	   a	   further	   analysis	   of	   the	  efficiency	   of	   blocking	   orders,	   which	   is	   something	   that	   was	   definitely	   missing	  from	  the	  previous	  decisions.	  Arnold	  J	  makes	  a	  very	  interesting	  statement	  in	  that	  regard.	  He	  claims	  that	  the	  effect	  of	  the	  Italian	  blocking	  order	  resulted	  in	  a	  73%	  reduction	  in	  audience	  going	  to	  The	  Pirate	  Bay,	  and	  an	  astounding	  96%	  reduction	  in	  page	  views.	  He	  also	  claimed	  that	  before	  the	  TPB	  blocking	  the	  site	  was	  ranked	  43	  in	  the	  web-­‐metric	  site	  Alexa	  for	  the	  UK,	  while	  after	  the	  block	  it	  had	  fallen	  to	  number	  293.	  	  These	  are	  some	  remarkable	  claims.	  If	  taken	  at	  face	  value,	  they	  would	  prove	  to	  be	  unequivocal	   evidence	   that	   blocking	   orders	   do	   work	   really	   well,	   and	   that	   the	  result	  is	  a	  clear	  reduction	  in	  traffic	  against	  blocked	  sites.	  However,	   extraordinary	   claims	   require	   extraordinary	   evidence,	   and	   I	   have	   not	  been	  able	  to	  find	  any	  corroboration	  to	  these	  factual	  statements	  contained	  in	  the	  ruling.	  On	  the	  contrary,	  a	  report	  by	  the	  UK’s	  OFCOM48	  looking	  at	  the	  efficiency	  of	  blocking	   orders	   specifically	   stated	   that	   these	   are	   not	   particularly	   efficient	   as	  people	  who	   are	  willing	   to	   do	   so	   can	   easily	   circumvent	   them.	   Furthermore,	   the	  report	  concluded	  that:	  	  
“To	   be	   successful,	   any	   process	   also	   needs	   to	   acknowledge	   and	   seek	   to	  
address	   concerns	   from	   citizens	   and	   legitimate	   users,	   for	   example	   that	  
site	   blocking	   could	  ultimately	  have	  an	  adverse	   impact	   on	  privacy	  and	  
freedom	  of	  expression.	  	  
Any	  process	  designed	  to	  generate	  a	  blocking	  injunction	  also	  needs	  to	  be	  
fair,	   such	   that	   the	   legitimate	   interests	   of	   other	   interested	   parties	   (i.e.	  
sites	  which	  could	  be	  blocked	  by	  these	  processes,	  the	  end	  users	  who	  may	  
lose	  access	   to	  particular	  content	  and	  the	   ISPs	  who	  may	  be	   involved	   in	  
blocking	  obligations)	  can	  be	  properly	  considered	  by	  a	  Court.”	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  OFCOM.	  "Site	  Blocking”	  to	  Reduce	  Online	  Copyright	  Infringement:	  A	  Review	  of	  Sections	  17	  and	  18	  
of	  the	  Digital	  Economy	  Act.	  Official	  Advice,	  (2010),	  http://bit.ly/175vMBN.	  	  
This	  is	   largely	  what	  was	  concluded	  by	  the	  ECJ	  in	  SABAM,	  and	  it	   is	  precisely	  the	  type	  of	  analysis	  that	  is	  lacking	  in	  the	  three	  cases	  under	  analysis.	  	  Moreover,	  the	  problem	  with	  the	  statistics	  cited	  by	  the	  judge	  is	  precisely	  that	  it	  is	  extremely	  difficult	  to	  obtain	  data	  about	  a	  block	  because	  those	  who	  are	  intent	  on	  circumventing	  the	  order	  will	  not	  be	  easy	  to	  track.	  For	  example,	  if	  people	  in	  Italy	  are	  using	  a	  proxy	  server49	  or	  a	  virtual	  private	  network	  (VPN)50	  to	  bypass	  the	  TPB	  blocking,	  it	  is	  obvious	  that	  they	  will	  not	  show	  up	  in	  normal	  metrics	  as	  accessing	  the	  site	  from	  Italy	  at	  all.	  Similarly,	  the	  claim	  that	  one	  can	  gather	  any	  meaningful	  data	  from	  Alexa	  rankings	  is	   highly	   suspect.	   Alexa	  works	   by	  measuring	   the	   behaviour	   of	   users	  who	   have	  installed	   a	   toolbar	   in	   their	   browser.	   This	   gives	   a	   snapshot	   of	   a	   very	   narrow	  demographic,	  that	  of	  Alexa	  toolbar	  users.	  Needless	  to	  say,	  people	  who	  are	  more	  likely	  to	  share	  files	  online	  are	  less	  likely	  to	  have	  any	  sort	  of	  toolbar	  installed	  on	  their	  browsers,	  particularly	  one	  that	  tracks	  online	  behaviour.	  Similarly,	  there	  are	  studies51	  that	  prove	   that	  Alexa’s	   rankings	   tend	   to	  be	  wrong	   for	  both	   small	   and	  big	  websites,	  as	  they	  produce	  some	  serious	  mismatches	  with	  reality.	  In	  the	  end,	  the	  best	  way	  to	  try	  to	  ascertain	  the	  effect	  of	  ISP	  blocking	  orders	  is	  to	  ask	  the	  people	  who	  are	  engaged	  in	  the	  practice.	  This	  is	  precisely	  what	  was	  done	  by	  Dutch	   researchers,52	  which	   conducted	   a	   survey	  of	   thousands	  of	  users	   about	  their	  downloading	  behaviour.	  While	  more	  than	  75%	  of	  respondents	  claimed	  that	  they	   never	   downloaded	   any	   illegal	   content,	   those	  who	   engaged	   in	   the	   practice	  replied	   that	   they	  were	   not	   affected	  whatsoever	   by	   the	   blocking	   of	   TPB	   in	   the	  Netherlands.	  Only	  3.6%	  claimed	  that	   they	  are	  downloading	   less,	  and	  only	  1.9%	  admitted	   that	   they	   had	   stopped	   downloading	   entirely.	   This	   seems	   like	   a	   huge	  failure	  for	  blocking	  orders.	  Despite	  the	  evidence,	  the	  growing	  number	  of	  cases	  allowing	  blocking	  injunctions	  is	   undoubtedly	   going	   to	   continue.	   Similarly,	   legislators	   are	   following	   suit	   and	  giving	   a	   stamp	   of	   approval	   to	   this	   approach.	   The	   UK	   government	   passed	   the	  Digital	  Economy	  Act	  2010,	  which	  contains	  a	  section	  specially	  dedicated	  to	  secure	  blocking	  injunctions.	  	  We	  can	  conclude	  that	  while	  the	  evidence	  continues	  to	  point	  towards	  the	  lack	  of	  efficacy	   of	   blocking	   and	   filtering	   efforts,	   legislators,	   content	   owners	   and	   the	  courts	  will	  continue	  to	  use	  them,	  because	  at	  least	  it	  allows	  them	  to	  believe	  that	  something	  is	  being	  done	  to	  stop	  online	  piracy.	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  These	   are	   sites	   that	   allow	   users	   to	  mask	   their	   originating	   IP	   address,	   making	   it	   possible	   to	  circumvent	  blocks.	  	  50	  These	  are	  encrypted	  private	  networks	  that	  make	  it	  look	  as	  if	  the	  user	  is	  browsing	  the	  Internet	  from	  another	  country,	  which	  also	  can	  bypass	  filters.	  	  51 	  Arrington	   M,	   “Alexa's	   Make	   Believe	   Internet”,	   TechCrunch	   (November	   25,	   2007),	  http://tcrn.ch/166ldu0.	  	  	  52	  Poort	   J	  and	  Leenheer	   J,	  Filesharing	  2©12,	  Downloaden	  in	  Nederland,	   Institute	   for	   Information	  Law	  (IViR)	  Report	  (2012),	  http://bit.ly/166lWv7.	  	  	  
5.	  Graduated	  response	  If	   this	   paper	   had	   been	   written	   a	   few	   years	   earlier,	   then	   it	   would	   have	   dealt	  mostly	   with	   the	   growing	   trend	   towards	   graduated	   response,	   also	   known	   as	  three-­‐strikes	   legislation.	   This	   is	   because	   several	   countries	   started	  playing	  with	  the	  idea	  of	  turning	  Internet	  service	  providers	  into	  copyright	  enforcers.	  	  The	   idea	   behind	   graduated	   response	   is	   that	   content	   owners	   would	   identify	  habitual	  file-­‐sharers	  through	  their	  IP	  address,	  and	  then	  they	  would	  send	  a	  notice	  to	  the	  ISP	  that	  owns	  such	  an	  address.	  After	  this	  step,	  there	  are	  various	  different	  manners	  in	  which	  the	  intermediary	  would	  have	  to	  comply,	  the	  most	  common	  of	  which	  would	  be	  for	  the	  provider	  to	  send	  a	  letter	  of	  warning,	  followed	  by	  a	  second	  warning,	  and	  then	  if	  the	  infringement	  continued	  there	  would	  be	  a	  disconnection	  order	  (hence	  the	  nickname	  “three	  strikes”).53	  	  France	   has	   been	   the	  most	   prominent	   example	   of	   the	   graduated	   response	  with	  the	  passing	  in	  2009	  of	  the	  Loi	  favorisant	  la	  diffusion	  et	  la	  protection	  de	  la	  création	  
sur	   internet,54	  which	   established	   a	   governmental	   authority	   called	   the	   Haute	  
Autorité	   pour	   la	   diffusion	   des	   œuvres	   et	   la	   protection	   des	   droits	   sur	   internet	  (HADOPI),	   which	   is	   also	   the	   name	   by	   which	   the	   law	   is	   better	   known.	   The	  legislation	  allows	  a	  copyright	  holder	  to	  send	  a	  complaint	  to	  HADOPI	  detailing	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  offence	  and	  the	  IP	  address	  involved.	  The	  authority	  may	  then	  initiate	  a	  process	  by	  contacting	   the	   ISP	   in	  question.	  The	  provider	  sends	  a	  notice	   to	   the	  account-­‐holder	  of	  the	  offending	  IP	  address,	  initiates	  a	  monitoring	  of	  the	  account,	  and	  might	  impose	  filters.	  If	  there	  is	  a	  repeat	  offence,	  then	  a	  second	  notice	  will	  be	  sent.	  If	  after	  a	  year	  after	  the	  second	  notice	  there	  is	  a	  continuation	  of	  the	  offender,	  then	   the	   ISP	   is	   required	   to	   suspend	   the	   Internet	   connection,	   the	   user	   is	  blacklisted,	  and	  other	  ISPs	  are	  notified.	  	  Many	  other	  countries	  adopted	  similar	  type	  of	  legislation,	  including	  New	  Zealand,	  Korea,	   Taiwan,	   Chile,	   and	   the	   UK. 55 	  Despite	   this	   initial	   push,	   many	   other	  countries	   decided	   not	   to	   adopt	   three-­‐strikes	   regimes,	   including	   Sweden,	  Germany	  and	  Spain.56	  	  The	   largest	   blow	   to	   the	   idea	   that	   ISPs	   should	   be	   able	   to	   disconnect	   users	   for	  copyright	   infringement	   came	   through	   the	   “Telecomms	   Package”, 57 	  which	  implemented	   an	   amendment	   (Amendment	   138)	   tabled	   by	   the	   European	  Parliament	   during	   deliberations	   in	   2008,	   that	   was	   to	   be	   included	   in	   the	  Framework	   Directive	   2002/21/EC. 58 	  The	   European	   Parliament	   passed	   the	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  Yu	  PK,	  “The	  Graduated	  Response”,	  62	  Florida	  Law	  Review	  1373	  (2010).	  	  54	  France,	  LOI	  n°	  2009–669	  du	  12	  juin	  2009	  favorisant	  la	  diffusion	  et	  la	  protection	  de	  la	  création	  sur	  internet.	  	  55	  Edwards	  L,	  The	  Role	  and	  Responsibility	  of	  Internet	  Intermediaries	  in	  the	  Field	  of	  Copyright	  and	  
Related	  Rights.	  WIPO	  Report	  WIPO-­‐ISOC/GE/11	  (2011).	  	  56	  Ibid.	  	  57	  Directive	  2009/140/EC	  of	  the	  European	  Parliament	  and	  of	  the	  Council	  of	  25	  November	  2009	  amending	  Directives	  2002/21/EC,	  2002/19/EC,	  and	  2002/20/EC,	  OJ	  L	  337/37	  (2009).	  58	  Directive 2002/21/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 7 March 2002 on a common 
regulatory framework for electronic communications networks and services OJ L 108/33 (2002). 	  
amendment	  138	  during	  the	  first	  two	  readings	  of	  the	  Telecomms	  Package,	  and	  it	  included	  the	  following	  paragraph	  to	  Art	  8.4:	  
“applying	   the	   principle	   that	   no	   restriction	   may	   be	   imposed	   on	   the	  
fundamental	  rights	  and	  freedoms	  of	  end-­‐users,	  without	  a	  prior	  ruling	  by	  
the	   judicial	   authorities,	   notably	   in	   accordance	   with	   Article	   11	   of	   the	  
Charter	   of	   Fundamental	   Rights	   of	   the	   European	  Union	   on	   freedom	   of	  
expression	  and	  information,	  save	  when	  public	  security	  is	  threatened	  in	  
which	  case	  the	  ruling	  may	  be	  subsequent.”59	  This	  clearly	  reads	  as	  an	  indictment	  of	  all	  graduated	  response,	  as	  it	  requires	  that	  any	  restriction	  on	  the	  rights	  of	  end-­‐users	  would	  have	  to	  be	  handed-­‐in	  by	  a	  court	  order,	   and	  not	   by	   a	   private	   administrative	   procedure	   as	   is	   necessitated	  by	   the	  prevailing	  graduated	  responses	  solutions.	  However,	   the	  above	   text	  came	  under	  fire	  by	  the	  Commission	  just	  before	  third	  reading,	  as	  it	  was	  seen	  as	  going	  too	  far.	  If	  the	   text	   had	   been	   kept	   like	   this,	   it	   would	   have	   had	   serious	   implications	   for	  existing	   laws	   like	   HADOPI.	   The	   institutional	   stand-­‐off	   was	   diverted	   by	   the	  adoption	   of	   a	   compromise	   text	   that	   includes	   a	   new	   provision	   to	   Art	   1	   of	   the	  Framework	  Directive	  that	  reads:	  	  
“3a.	  Measures	   taken	  by	  Member	  States	  regarding	  end-­‐users	  access’	   to,	  
or	  use	  of,	  services	  and	  applications	  through	  electronic	  communications	  
networks	  shall	  respect	  the	  fundamental	  rights	  and	  freedoms	  of	  natural	  
persons,	  as	  guaranteed	  by	  the	  European	  Convention	  for	  the	  Protection	  
of	  Human	  Rights	  and	  Fundamental	  Freedoms	  and	  general	  principles	  of	  
Community	  law.	  
Any	  of	  these	  measures	  regarding	  end-­‐users’	  access	  to,	  or	  use	  of,	  services	  
and	  applications	  through	  electronic	  communications	  networks	  liable	  to	  
restrict	   those	   fundamental	   rights	   or	   freedoms	  may	  only	   be	   imposed	   if	  
they	  are	  appropriate,	  proportionate	  and	  necessary	  within	  a	  democratic	  
society	  […]"	  This	   does	   not	   affect	   graduated	   response	   measures	   already	   deployed,	   but	   it	  creates	  the	  principle	  that	  any	  sort	  of	  restriction	  to	  access	  to	  the	  Internet	  should	  be	  performed	  if	  they	  are	  “appropriate,	  proportionate	  and	  necessary”.	  This	  is	  an	  interesting	  case	  in	  which	  IP	  law	  is	  a	  subordinate	  of	  human	  rights	  law.	  	  This	   connection	  between	  basic	   rights	   and	   the	   Internet	   is	   a	   growing	   trend,	   and	  explains	   the	   fact	   that	  more	   decisions	   about	   ISP	   liability	  may	   have	   to	   consider	  human	  rights	  before	  the	  rights	  of	  copyright	  holders,	  and	  therefore	  explains	  the	  decreasing	  viability	  of	  graduated	  response	  as	  a	  serious	  option	  for	  enforcement.	  Access	  to	  information	  and	  communication	  technologies	  is	  increasingly	  seen	  as	  a	  basic	  right,60	  and	  anything	  that	  might	  affect	  negatively	  a	  user’s	  prerogatives	  will	  require	  a	  ruling	  by	  a	  court	  of	  law,	  and	  not	  just	  an	  internal	  ISP	  procedure.	  An	   indication	   of	   the	   growing	  mandate	   in	   favour	   of	   the	   rights	   of	   access	   can	   be	  found	   in	   the	   resolution	   of	   the	   United	   Nations	   Human	   Rights	   Council	   on	   the	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  See:	  http://bit.ly/19yyT2S.	  	  	  60 	  See:	   Guadamuz	   A,	   “Costa	   Rican	   court	   declares	   the	   Internet	   as	   a	   fundamental	   right”,	  
Technollama	  (October	  2nd,	  2010),	  http://bit.ly/11Y5EA4.	  	  	  
promotion,	  protection	  and	  enjoyment	  of	  human	  rights	  on	  the	  Internet.61	  This	  is	  a	  ground-­‐breaking	   document	   in	   the	   history	   of	   digital	   rights	   because	   for	   the	   first	  time	  we	  have	  an	  international	  declaration	  that	  equates	  offline	  and	  online	  rights.	  The	  declaration	  is	  also	  noteworthy	  because	  it	  prompts	  governments	  to	  promote	  and	   facilitate	  access	   to	   the	   Internet.	  This	  has	   the	  effect	  of	   featuring	  a	  powerful	  text	   against	   legal	   disconnection	   regimes.	   The	   relevant	   parts	   of	   the	  Declaration	  state:	  	  
“3.	  Calls	  upon	  all	  States	  to	  promote	  and	  facilitate	  access	  to	  the	  Internet	  
and	  international	  cooperation	  aimed	  at	  the	  development	  of	  media	  and	  
information	  and	  communications	  facilities	  in	  all	  countries;	  
5.	   Decides	   to	   continue	   its	   consideration	   of	   the	   promotion,	   protection	  
and	   enjoyment	   of	   human	   rights,	   including	   the	   right	   to	   freedom	   of	  
expression,	  on	  the	  Internet	  and	  in	  other	  technologies,	  as	  well	  as	  of	  how	  
the	   Internet	   can	   be	   an	   important	   tool	   for	   development	   and	   for	  
exercising	  human	  rights,	  in	  accordance	  with	  its	  programme	  of	  work.”	  While	  this	  is	  a	  non-­‐binding	  declaration,	  it	  can	  be	  used	  as	  an	  interpretation	  guide	  in	  future	  court	  decisions,	  particularly	  those	  in	  front	  of	  courts	  of	  human	  rights	  (eg.	  the	  Inter-­‐American	  Court	  of	  Human	  Rights).	  The	  resolutions	  can	  also	  be	  used	  by	  the	  Council	  in	  case	  of	  a	  dispute	  on	  any	  abuse	  of	  human	  rights.	  Other	  than	  the	  argument	  against	  disconnection	  from	  a	  human	  rights	  perspective,	  whenever	  one	   looks	  at	  graduated	  response	  one	  has	   to	  admit	   that	   it	   is	  a	  deeply	  flawed	  concept	   for	  various	  other	  reasons.	  The	  system	  is	  based	  on	  the	   idea	  that	  perpetrators	  of	  copyright	  infringement	  can	  be	  easily	  identified	  by	  an	  IP	  address,	  which	  is	  far	  from	  reliable.	  Even	  if	  an	  IP	  address	  is	  identified	  correctly	  as	  sharing	  copyright	  content	  without	  authorisation,	  and	  that	   is	  a	  big	   if,62	  there	  is	  still	   little	  indication	  about	  who	  exactly	  committed	  the	  offence.	  Particularly,	  in	  a	  multi-­‐user	  household,	   there	   would	   be	   a	   serious	   chance	   of	   the	   account	   holder	   being	   held	  responsible	   for	   the	   actions	   of	   someone	   else. 63 	  Furthermore,	   the	   threat	   of	  disconnection	  could	  be	  placed	  towards	  entirely	  innocent	  people,	  which	  certainly	  would	  go	  against	  the	  principle	  of	  proportionality	  that	  sits	  at	  the	  cornerstone	  of	  the	  prevalent	  case	  law	  and	  legislation,	  at	  least	  in	  the	  EU.	  	  Only	   time	   will	   tell	   if	   the	   trend	   towards	   dismissal	   of	   graduated	   response	  continues.	   There	   are	   two	   contrasting	   developments	   emerging	   at	   the	   time	   of	  writing.	  On	  the	  one	  hand,	  HADOPI	  has	  been	  under	  fire	  by	  a	  report	  delivered	  to	  the	   French	   Minister	   of	   Culture,	   which	   has	   called	   for	   a	   transfer	   of	   all	   the	  graduated	   response	   tasks	   to	   another	   department,	   and	   recommends	   the	  replacement	   of	   the	   disconnection	   third	   stage	   in	   favour	   of	   fines.64	  On	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   other	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  The	   Human	   Rights	   Council,	  The	   promotion,	   protection	   and	   enjoyment	   of	   human	   rights	   on	   the	  
Internet,	  A/HRC/20/L.13	  (29	  June,	  2012).	  	  62	  Piatek	  M,	  Kohno	  T,	  and	  Krishnamurthy	  A,	  "Challenges	  and	  Directions	  for	  Monitoring	  P2P	  File	  Sharing	   Networks	   -­‐	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   -­‐	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   Printer	   Received	   a	   DMCA	   Takedown	   Notice",	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  California	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  2008),	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  63	  For	  an	  interesting	  case	  dealing	  with	  these	  questions,	  see:	  Media	  CAT	  Ltd	  v	  Adams	  &	  Ors	  [2011]	  EWPCC	  10.	  	  64	  Lescure	  P,	  Rapport	  de	  la	  Mission	  «	  Acte	  II	  de	  l’exception	  culturelle	  »	  :	  Contribution	  aux	  politiques	  
culturelles	  à	  l’ère	  numérique.	  Rapport	  au	  Ministère	  de	  la	  Culture	  et	  de	  la	  Communication	  (2013),	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hand,	   some	   ISPs	   in	   the	   US	   have	   signed-­‐up	   voluntarily	   to	   a	   system	   called	   the	  Center	   for	   Copyright	   Information,	   which	   favours	   what	   is	   now	   called	   a	   “six	  strikes”	  approach	  by	  which	  intermediaries	  will	  send	  notices	  to	  users,	  as	  well	  as	  potentially	   reducing	   Internet	   speeds	   and	   redirecting	   traffic	   temporarily.65	  The	  next	  stage	  for	  graduated	  response	  might	  be	  an	  end	  to	  legislative	  solutions,	  but	  an	  increase	  in	  voluntary	  schemes.	  	  
6.	  Conclusion	  	  At	  the	  time	  of	  writing,	  whistle-­‐blower	  Edward	  Snowden	  has	  been	  catapulted	  at	  the	   top	  of	   the	  news	  by	   leaking	   information	   about	  how	  US	   intelligence	   services	  are	   engaging	   in	   a	   massive	   surveillance	   programme	   that	   accesses	   servers	   and	  communications	   from	   intermediary	   services	   to	   tap	   into	   users’	   data. 66 	  The	  companies	  involved	  are	  some	  of	  the	  largest	  technology	  companies	  in	  the	  world,	  including	  Microsoft,	  Yahoo,	  Google,	  Facebook,	  YouTube,	  Skype,	  AOL	  and	  Apple.	  	  While	  the	  privacy	  and	  civil	  liberties	  implications	  of	  the	  PRISM	  and	  NSA	  leaks	  go	  beyond	   the	   scope	   of	   this	   paper,	   these	   revelations	   serve	   to	   emphasise	   the	  importance	   of	   intermediaries	   to	   our	   daily	   lives.	   It	   is	   quite	   indicative	   that	  intelligence	   agencies	   are	  mainly	   using	   existing	   commercial	   data	   channels,	   and	  have	   not	   had	   to	   deploy	   their	   own	   surveillance	   mechanisms.	   The	   role	   of	   the	  intermediary	  as	  the	  host	  and	  carrier	  of	  information	  has	  turned	  these	  companies	  into	  much	  more	  than	  mere	  gatekeepers,	  they	  act	  as	  information	  clearinghouses.	  	  The	   growing	   important	   role	   of	   technological	   mediators	   is	   precisely	   why	  intermediary	   liability	   continues	   to	   be	   a	   relevant	   topic,	   even	   after	   all	   of	   these	  years.	   It	  may	   seem	   like	   a	   dry	   area	   of	   study,	   too	   narrow	   to	   elicit	  more	   interest	  than	   that	   awarded	   to	   it	   by	   IP	   law	   experts	   and	   a	   few	   technology	   enthusiasts.	  However,	   it	   is	   proved	   to	   be	   a	   subject	   that	   touches	   all	   sorts	   of	   interests,	   from	  security	  to	  privacy,	  requiring	  a	  careful	  balancing	  act.	  	  We	   would	   therefore	   like	   to	   finish	   with	   a	   small	   proposal	   for	   how	   to	   regulate	  intermediaries.	   Anything	   that	   might	   affect	   users’	   rights	   has	   to	   be	   seen	   as	   the	  exception	   and	   not	   the	   norm;	   and	   any	   such	   action	   has	   to	   be	   appropriate,	  proportional	  and	  necessary.	  Nothing	  else	  will	  do.	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